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Punitive Damages: A Primer for Utah,
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange
I.

INTRODUCTION

The subject of punitive damages has always been controversial. Some have considered punitive damages unbecoming of the law. 1 Others have recognized that they serve
important purposes in deterring misconduct of entities otherwise beyond the reach of punishment. 2
The Utah Supreme Court recently reviewed the issues
involved with punitive damages and adopted a standard of
review in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange.a Crookston
stands for the premise that although there are some limits
to punitive damage liability, these limits are not so precise
as to allow the threat of their imposition to become a calculable amount, "thus diminishing the deterrent effect of punitive damages." 4
This note examines failed constitutional attacks on punitive damages under the excessive fines and due process
clauses of the United States Constitution, and then outlines
the considerations that must be met before punitive damage
awards will be upheld in Utah. Finally, the punitive damage Issues that still await decision in Utah will be noted.
II.

THE FACTS OF CROOKSTON

Crookston arose when a home under construction collapsed. The home was an 'earth house,' a structure designed
to be partially covered with soil to take advantage of the

1.
See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872), cited in Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 10:12, 1038 n.4 (1991), where punitive damages were
described as a "wrong . . . a monstrous heresy . . . an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law."
SPe, e.g, Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 19-20 (Wis. 1914), cited in Haslip,
2.
111 S. Ct. at 1038 n.4.
The law ).,riving exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the English love
of liberty regulated by law. It tends to elevate the jury as a responsible
institute of government, discourage private reprisals, restrains the strong,
influential, and unscrupulous, vindicates the right of the weak, and encourages recourse to and confidence in the courts of law by those
wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not cognizable in or not sufficiently punished by the criminal law.

!d.
3.

4.

817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
!d. at 809.
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earth's natural heating and cooling. 5 The house was nearly
complete when it collapsed. 6 The structure was so completely destroyed that the contractor who eventually purchased
the lot and wreckage testified that very little of the original
construction material could be salvaged. 7
Fire Insurance Exchange insured the Crookstons for this
type of loss, with the financing bank as the sole loss payee
under the terms of the contract. 8 The original insurance
company adjuster received two bids for the reconstruction of
the house, one for $50,951 and the other for $49,600. Mter
examining these bids the insurance company's regional office
extended settlement authority in the amount of $49,443. 9
Soon thereafter an adjuster with more experience was
assigned to the case. 10 He commissioned an engineering
report, limited to structural damage, and used this as the
basis for obtaining an estimate from an inexperienced contractor for $27 ,830.60.n It was revealed at trial that this
contractor was the son of an agent of the insurance company, and that the bid did not include substantial amounts
of work that would have been needed to fully rehabilitate
the dwelling. 12
Based on this bid, the new adjustor settled with the
bank for a little more than $32,000, without notice to the
Crookstons or mention of the higher bids. 13 Because the
settlement was insufficient to cover the construction loan,
the Crookstons were unable to financially recover from the
loss, were forced to deed the home back to the bank in lieu
of foreclosure, and eventually had to seek protection from
creditors in bankruptcy. 14
Justice Stewart pointed out that the trial court had
before it additional factors that justified the imposition of

5.
!d. at 794.
6.
!d.
7.
Respondent's Brief at 8, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah)
(No. 880034) (1991).
8.
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 794.
9.
Id. (A third bid, for $74,000, was made after the settlement was authorized.)

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

!d.
Id.
Respondent's brief at 7, Crookston (880034).
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 794.
Id. at 795.

l
I
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punitive damages. 15 He noted that the second adjustor used
what the company termed in its defense, "sound business
practices." 16 Other employees of the company testified that
they felt the Crookstons had been treated fairly. 17 Finally,
the adjuster, who had a reputation of improving company
profits, received two promotions between the incident and
the trial. 18
The Crookstons sued the bank for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty,
misrepresentation and fraud, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 19 They sued the insurance company for
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
misrepresentation and fraud. 20
The bank settled just before trial.:n Fire Insurance Exchange went to trial. The jury, having heard the above,
awarded $815,826 in compensatory damages, and $4 million
in punitive damages. 22 The insurance company's motions
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial and
remittitur were all denied. 23
Ill.

ATTACKS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

On appeal, Fire Insurance Exchange argued that the
jury award violated federal and state constitutional due
process guarantees 24 and prohibitions of excessive fines. 25
While the Utah Supreme Court was considering
Crookston, the United States Supreme Court made two important decisions in regard to the federal constitutionality of
punitive damages. 26 These decisions, Browning-Ferris Indus-

15.
!d. at 816 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16.
!d.
17.
!d.
18.
ld.
19.
ld. at 795.
20.
ld.
21.
ld.
22.
ld.
23.
ld.
24.
Appellant's Brief at 33, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah)
(No. 880034) (1991).
25.
!d. at 31.
Prior to these two decisions, commentators had written extensively on the
26.
subject of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards, see, e.g., Symposium,
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tries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. ,27 and Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 28 make it clear that punitive damages
can be imposed without violating federal constitutional guarantees of due process 29 and protection against excessive
fines. 30
The Utah Constitution's due process guarantee 31 and
prohibition against excessive fines 32 are virtually identical
to the federal clauses. Although the Utah Constitution has
been interpreted to provide protections beyond those of the
federal Constitution, 33 Crookston was not reviewed under
the state constitutional standards as these issues were not
raised below. 34
IV.

REVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN UTAH

Although the Utah Supreme Court declined to review
the Crookston damage awards for either state or federal
constitutional infirmities, it did review the award m light of
Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 687 (1989), and many believed that they were
not constitutional as imposed, see, e.g., Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional
Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983).
27.
492 U.S. 257 (1989). In regard to the excessive fines clause, the Court
said, "Whatever the outer confines of the Clause's reach may be, we now decide
only that it does not constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when
the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a
share of the damages awarded." !d. at 268-64.
28.
111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). In considering the amount nf punitive damages in
a case the Court said:
One must concede that unlimited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities. We need
not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and unacceptable that would fit every case.
!d. at 1048 (citation omitted).
29.
U.S. CCJNST. amend. XIV, § 1, "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
::!0.
U.S. CCJNST. amend. VIII, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nClr excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
31.
UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 7, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."
32.
UTAH CCJNST. art. 1, § 9, "Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted."
3::!.
See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (opening unlocked car
door to examine a vehicle identification number, although permissible under
federal law, a violation of state constitutional guarantees); State v. Bobo, 80:-l P.2d
1268, 1272 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("[A]ttorneys [need to I heed the call of the
appellate courts of this state to more fully brief and argue the applicability of the
state constitution . . . .").
34.
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, l'W0-01 (Utah 1991).
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Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules provide, inter
alia, that: "[A] new trial may be granted . . . for any of
the following causes: . . . (5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice. (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the
law."35
The compensatory and punitive damage awards were
reviewed separately by the court. The compensatory damages were upheld because the trial judge gave specific consideration, on the record, to the appropriateness of the
award. 36 The trial judge did not properly consider the punitive damages aspect of the award, however. 37
The two part inquiry established by the court38 requires the trial court, in reviewing punitive damages to
determine: (1) that they were appropriate at all, 39 and (2)
that the amount is neither excessive nor inadequate. 40 In
this case the trial court properly established that punitive
damages were appropriate, 41 stating:
During the course of the ten or so days that we tried the
case, it was my observation that indeed we were dealing
here with conduct which was pernicious, pernicious not
merely in the sense of the defendant['s] having taken und[ue] advantage of the insureds, the Crookstons, in treating their claim in a high handed fashion, but pernicious
further in the sense that clear, unequivocal misrepresentations were made by agents of the defendant to the plaintiffs and to their counsel, and as if that were not sufficient, pernicious in the form of conduct, which, while it
may not have been geared to create emotional harm and
suffering to the plaintiffs, was, at the very least, in reck-

35.
UTAH R. C!V. P. 59(a).
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 806.
36.
37.
!d. at 807-08.
38.
!d. at 807.
· 39.
The evidence must be "sufficient to support a lawful jury finding of
defendant's requisite mental state." !d. (citing UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(a)(6); Elkington
v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359-60,
(Utah 1975); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1975)).
40.
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 807, (citing UTAH R. C!V. P. 59(a)(5).) (stating that
the amount must not appear to have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice).
41.
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 807.
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less disregard of their rights by dealing sub rosa with the
42
bank and thereafter closing the file

However, as to the second part of the punitive damages
inquiry, the trial court did not consider the distinct factors
that apply to punitive damage awards. These factors are
reflections of the special punitive damage goals of punishment and deterrence. The factors, outlined m Utah in
Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 43 are:
(i) the relative wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of
the alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts and circumstances
surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof on the
lives of the plaintiffs and others; (v) the probability of the
future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the relationship of
the parties; and (vii) the amount of the actual damages
awarded. 44

The Crookston jury had these factors before it, 45 but the
trial judge did not review them in considering the motion

42.
!d. at 806 (alterations in original).
43.
692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984); see also Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766
(Utah 1985).
44.
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 808.
Jury instruction number 33 stated that after determining to award puni45.
tive damages the jury should consider the following in calculating the amount:
[S]uch sum as in your best judgement would be reasonable and proper
as a punishment to Fire Insurance Exchange for such wrongs, and as a
wholesome warning to others not to offend in a like manner. If such
punitive damages are given, you should award them with caution and
you should keep in mind they are only for the purpose just mentioned
and not the measure of compensatory damages.
In determining the amount of punitive damages, you should consider
each of the following factors:
1. the relative wealth of the defendant;
2. the nature of the defendants misconduct;
3. the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's misconduct;
4. the effect of the defendant's misconduct on the lives of the plaintiffs and others;
5. the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct;
6. the relationship between the parties; and
7. the amount of compensatory damages awarded.
Punitive damages should be more than an inconvenience to the defendant and their amount should be sufficient to discourage the defendant
and other companies similarly situated from doing or repeating such
misconduct in the future.
Respondents' Brief, Appendix H, Crookston (880034).
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for a new trial on the amount of punitive damages. 46 The
failure to review the factors would not have been fatal of
itself. But, because the amount of the punitive damages
"exceed[ed] the bounds of the general pattern set by .
prior decisions,"47 the denial of the motion for new trial on
the punitive damages issue was vacated and remanded. 48
The Utah Supreme Court gave the trial court a generous amount of counsel on how to consider the issues on remand. The court first noted that the factors it provided in
Bundy did not give any guidance as to how they should be
assessed or their respective weights. 49 The court said that
this lack of guidance was a common problem. 50
One solution to the problem, the imposition of strict
limits on the award of punitive damages has been adopted
by some legislatures51 and courts. 52 However, the Utah
Supreme Court feared that adoption of an absolute ceiling of
whatever type would "diminish[] the deterrent effect of punitive damages"53 because it would "allow potential defendants to calculate their exposure to liability in advance."54
Further, strict ratios would "not provide the flexibility needed to deal adequately with the type of case that involves
only minimal actual damages, but where the conduct of the

46.
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 807.
47.
!d.
48.
!d. at 807-08.
49.
!d. at 808.
50.
!d., (citing AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PuNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
3-7 (1989)).
51.
Limitations take one of two forms, ratio limits and dollar limits. In regard
to ratios, "See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-102 (1987) (punitives cannot exceed
actual damages); Fla. Stat. § 768.73(1)(a) (1989) (punitives cannot exceed three
times actual damages) . . . " Crookston, 817 P.2d at 809. For examples of dollar
amounts, "See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1 (Michie Supp. 1990) ($250,000
ceiling except in cases of product liability or intentional tort); Va. Code Ann. §
8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1990) ($350,000 ceiling)." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 809.
52.
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 809, (citing Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d
318, 331 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (giving a formula of three times compensatory damages); Triangle Sheet Metal Works v. Silver, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (Conn.
1966) (allowing it only to compensate litigation expenses); and Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980) (giving punitive
damages only compensate for intangible harm).
53.
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 809.
54.
!d.
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justify a large punitive
ground between allowing
a bright-line limitation. 56
opinions, 57 and observed

The general rule . . . appears to be that where the
punitive damages are well below $100,000, punitive damage awards beyond a 3 to 1 ratio to actual damages have
seldom been upheld and that where the award is in excess
of $100,000, we have indicated some inclination to overturn awards having ratios [even] of less than 3 to 1.58

The court said that in denying a motion for a new trial, the
trial court need give no explanation as to the amount of
punitive damages awarded if award ratios are within the
above ranges. 59 If the award is outside these bounds:
[T]he trial court is not bound to reduce it. However, if
such an award is upheld, the trial judge must make a
detailed and reasoned articulation of the grounds for concluding that the award is not excessive in light of the law
and the facts. The judge's articulation should generally be
couched in terms of one or more of the seven factors we
earlier listed as proper considerations in determining the
amount of punitive damages, unless some other factor
seems compelling to the trial court. For example, a trial
court might conclude that an award should stand, despite
a ratio that is higher than that we have generally approved, because the defendant displayed an extremely high
degree of malice, e.g., actual intent to harm or a high
degree of likelihood of great harm based on the reprehensible nature of the act. 60

fi5.
!d. (citation omitted).
56.
!d.
57.
!d. at 810, (citing, in the case of awards under $100,000, Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37
(Utah 1980); Powers v. Taylor, 379 P.2d 380 (Utah 1963); DeVas v. Noble, 369
P.2d 290 (Utah), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962); Evans v. Gaisford, 247 P.2d
431 (Utah 19.'i2)). For cases in excess of $100,000 the court cited Synergetics v.
Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705
P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); First Sec. Bank, N.A. v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591
(Utah 1982).
58.
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 810.
59.
!d. at 811.
!d. (citations omitted).
60.
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The court stated that the purpose of these standards is to
permit effective and reasoned appellate review, with appropriate deference to the position of the trial judge to appraise the witnesses and the evidence, leading to more substantive review of punitive damage awards. 61
V.

CONCLUDING THE CROOKSTON CLEAN-UP

The Crookston case was remanded for reconsideration in
light of the above standards. 62 The court then went on63
to consider potential ramifications of its ruling. The court
noted, without expressing an opinion as to its appropriateness, that should additur or remittitur be granted in regards to the punitive damages, the grounds for doing so
should be explained. 64 In addition, the court warned parties
not to try to avoid the considerable deference given to the
trial courts in this area by appealing rather than moving
for reconsideration. The court said that if a party appeals
an award without motion for new trial, appellate courts
would assume that a new trial motion was considered sua
sponte by the trial court and denied. 65
VI.PUNITIVE DAMAGES BEYOND CROOKSTON

Crookston establishes a framework for the judicial review of punitive damage awards pursuant to the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. It does not, however, lay to rest the
issue of punitive damages in Utah. Both the holding in
Crookston and Utah's statutory modification of punitive
damage law may be subject to attack on constitutional
grounds.
A.

Due Process

The United States Supreme Court held that federal due
process was not offended in Haslip 66 because: ( 1) the jury

61.
!d.
62.
!d. at H12.
6.1.
See id. at H1:i-14 (Howe, Associate C.J., concurring with reservations) see
also id. H14 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Crook~ton, H17 P.2d at 811.
64.
6.5.
!d. at 812.
66.
Pacilic Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 10:12 (1991).
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was instructed about the purpose of punitive damages 67
and evidence of defendant's wealth was excluded, by state
law, at the trial; 68 (2) post-trial review procedures were in
place that required the trial court to reflect, in the record,
why or why not the verdict was adjusted;69 and (3) appellate review of punitive awards assured reasonableness and
rationality in regards to the punitive and deterrent goals of
punitive damages. 70
The Crookston ruling is consistent with the requirements of Haslip except in one area-in Crookston the jury
was instructed, in accord with Bundy, 71 to consider the
wealth of the defendant. 72 The Haslip court did not identify the reason that the exclusion of evidence of the
defendant's wealth was appropriate. The Court simply noted
that the issue was excluded at the trial pursuant to Alabama law. 73 In this particular exclusion of evidence, Alabama law is the common law exception rather than the
rule, 74 but if the Supreme Court intends to adopt the peculiar Alabama position, the Utah Court's use of the Bundy
criteria would be subject to attack under the federal due
process guarantee.

B.

The Excessive Fines Clause

In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 75
the Supreme Court held that between private parties there
is no state action in the award of punitive damages that
brings the federal excessive fines clause into play. 76 The
67.
Id. at 1044. The court stated that the purpose of punitive damages is,
"'[N]ot to compensate the plaintiff for any injury' but 'to punish the defendant'
and for the added purpose of protecting the public by [deterring] the defendant
and others from doing such wrong in the future." (alterations in original).
!d.
68.
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 1045.
71.
Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984).
72.
Fire Insurance Exchange, in the year of the Crookston claim, had a net income of $23,000,000 and assets of $72::l,468,116. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 815-16
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73.
Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1044, (citing Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Whitman, 358 So. 2d 1025, 1026-27 (Ala. 1978) (liability for damages cannot be
based on the economic position of the parties)).
74.
See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 126(3) (1966). "While there is authority for the
contrary view, as a general rule the financial condition of the defendant may be
considered in determining the amount of exemplary damages . . . ." Id.
75.
492 u.s. 257 (1989).
ld. at 263-64. The court stated,"Whatever the outer confines of the
76.
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statutory modification of Utah punitive damage law, however, requires remittance to the state treasury of fifty percent
of any amount awarded as punitive damages in excess of
$20,000 and attorney fees and costs. 77 As Utah now has a
pecuniary interest in the award of punitive damages, the
distinction that existed between the award of punitive damages to a private party and the collection of fines by a state
that was emphasized in Browning·Ferris is blurred. The
importance of the distinction was reemphasized by the Court
in Harmelin v. Michigan. 78 The Court said:
As we have recognized in the context of other constitutional provisions, it makes sense to scrutinize governmental
action more closely when the State stands to benefit. (We
relied upon precisely the lack of incentive for abuse in
holding that "punitive damages" were not "fines" within
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.) 79

VII.

CONCLUSION.

The proper method for judicial review of punitive damage awards is now set out in Utah by Crookston. If punitive
damages exceed compensatory damages by more than a
three-to-one ratio, the punitive damages must be either
reduced or justified; if not, a new trial must be granted.
The issues of due process, implicated by the consideration of the defendant's wealth, and excessive fines, given
new life by the statutory levy imposed on punitive damage
awards, still must be resolved in regards to both the federal
and state Constitutions.
Punitive damages are not popular, and many believe
that they are damaging to the economy. 80 It has been proposed that they be sharply limited. 81 As noted in
Crookston, however, punitive damages prevent egregious

Clause's reach may be, we now decide only that it does not constrain an award of
money damages in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the
action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded." !d.
77.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (Supp. 1990).
78.
111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
79.
!d. at 2693 (citations omitted).
80.
David Gergen & Ted Gest, Ruling on Quayle v. Lawyers, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., August 26/September 2, 1991, at 44.
81.
!d.
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conduct on the part of defendants who are otherwise not
subject to meaningful censure. 82

David F. Barrett

H2.
"A $4,000,000 punitive damage award can certainly have a salubrious
effect in inducing the defendant to bring its practices into harmony with common
moral conduct and accepted business ethics, to say nothing of the requirements of
the law." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 816 (Stewart, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. ~14H, ~iH4 (Ct.
App. 1981) (finding a design flaw in the fuel system of the Ford Pinto could have
been remedied at minimal cost, hut "a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives
and limbs against corporate profits" dictated deferral of the correction).

